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Foreign Policy Legacies of the 
Clinton Administration for American 
Administrations in the Twenty .. first 
Century 
James M. McCormick 
On the first day of the NATO air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo 
in March 1999, President Clinton addressed the American people and justified 
American participation in those air strikes by asserting that "we are upholding 
our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace." 1 The 
United States, Clinton declared, was acting out of a "moral imperative" to help 
the people of Kosovo, but he also justified American actions as an effort to 
defend its "national interest" by preventing the conflict from spreading into the 
rest of Europe and by demonstrating the effectiveness of the NATO alliance in 
the post-Cold War era.2 By early 1999, foreign policy was an important issue 
for the administration, and its policy rationale now exhibited elements of both 
idealism and realism. 
Six years earlier, its foreign policy approach was different in at least two 
ways. First, foreign policy was not a central concern for the administration. 
Indeed, Clinton came to office with little foreign policy experience and with 
little interest in foreign affairs. Anthony Lake, Clinton's first national security 
adviser, was told to "keep foreign policy from becoming a problem-keep it 
off the screen and spare Clinton from getting embroiled as he [goes] about his 
domestic business."3 Second, to the extent that foreign policy was an issue, the 
Clinton approach was steeped in idealism. Two fundamental premises shaped 
its initial "strategy of enlargement" as the administration sought to create a more 
peaceful global community: (1) enlarge the number of democracies, since "de-
mocracies don't fight one another"; and (2) expand the number of market econ-
omies and global prosperity, since prospering nations do not have time to fight 
one another. According to this design, global peace and security would be pur-
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sued indirectly-and without the emphasis on alliances, force, and threat of Will 
that had marked the previous forty-five years. 
Despite the change in foreign policy emphasis during the Clinton administra· 
tion, a commori thread held its foreign policy process together: a concern for 
linking American 'domestic politics and American foreign policy. At the outset 
of its term, for 1l1stance, the emphasis on the growth of market democracies was 
. driven'by candidate Clinton's commitment to follow a foreign policy "grounded 
in Americ'a's demo"cratic values"4 and by the desire to pursue a foreign policy 
: that would assist the American economy. At the time of the Clinton adminis· 
tiati~n's actions' in K~sovo, the impact of domestic politics had not diminished. 
Becau~~ of the American public's opposition to the use of U.S. ground forces 
abroad, 5 President Clinton felt compelled to eschew sending troops to Koso1o 
in his Mffi-ch 1999 addre.ss.6 Furthermore, he had to proceed cautiously since 
Congress was divided over the wisdom of Kosovo policy. 7 
I begin this chapter by outlining the initial approach of the administration and 
by describing how it changed over time. Next, I discuss several international 
and domestic challenges that the Clinton administration faced in the foreign 
policy arena and their impact on its foreign policy approach. During this dis· 
cussion, I use several major foreign policy crises (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo) to illustrate the international challenges that the administration faced, 
and several domestic disputes over foreign policy issues to illustrate the effects 
of Congress, political parties, interest groups, and public opinion on Clinton's 
foreign policy approach. 
Several themes thus shape the subsequent analysis. First, I will contend ~at 
these domestic and international challenges focused greater presidential attenuon ' 
and involvement on foreign policy; that these challenges altered the Clinton 
administration's heavy dose of foreign policy idealism and produced a greater 
sense of political realism by its second term· and that the domestic constraints-
, . wheth~r from Congress, interest groups, and the public-were often crucial .m 
the Clmton administration's foreign policy responses. Based upon this analy~is, 
I conclu~e. by i?entifying several short-term and long-term legacies of the Clin· 
ton. admi~1s~r~tlon for American foreign policy-legacies in terms of both the 
poh~y pnonttes that the administration pursued and the policymaking process 
that it employed. 
THE CLINTON FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH: 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Bill Clinton came to offi d . . · tances 
. ce un er some unusual foreign pohcy circums 
and .with several apparent foreign policy disadvantages. As Clinton assumed the 
presidency' the fundamental rationale for American foreign policy over the past 
five decades had been I t th · · n 
os , e importance of foreign policy was in questio ' 
and the level of pub!" fj . · F h ic support or foreign policy actions seemed uncertain. 
urt ermore, unlike his two immediate predecessors, Bill Clinton came to office 
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neither with a strong ideological view on foreign affairs nor with much foreign 
policy experience. In addition, he promised to focus on the domestic economy, 
not on foreign policy. 
Despite these disadvantages, Bill Clinton also enjoyed a major advantage: the 
Cold War was over, and he had some margin for error in shaping and conducting 
American foreign policy. As such, he announced that he wanted to change 
American foreign policy from the "ad hoc" approach of the Bush years and 
establish a foreign policy based on American values. That is, instead of a foreign 
policy that had been "rudderless, reactive, and erratic" under the Bush admin-
istration, Clinton would have a foreign policy that was "strategic," "vigorous," 
and compatible with American values.8 At the outset of his administration, Pres-
ident Clinton sought to outline a policy that would do so. 
KEY PRINCIPLES 
The administration started by identifying three key principles to serve as 
guides to its foreign policy: (1) achieving economic security for the United 
States, (2) maintaining an appropriate defense posture for the post-Cold War 
era, and (3) promoting democracy worldwide.9 In addition, these principles were 
expected to serve as means for linking the foreign and domestic arenas. 
The first principle, achieving economic security, was an especially important 
initial policy guide and a crucial link between the two arenas. In his campaign 
for the presidency in 1992, Bill Clinton declared that the United States "must 
tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy."10 The 
isolation of one policy arena from the other was hampering America's ability 
to build an effective policy for the United States as a whole, especially in light 
of the dramatic changes in global politics and in light of the stagnant domestic 
economy. Hence, the United States would take several domestic actions to im-
prove America's global competitiveness and several international actions to open 
foreign markets. 11 Moreover, these foreign economic actions would be pursued 
as vigorously as the United States had waged the Cold War. 12 
The second principle, maintaining an effective defense, emphasized downsiz-
ing and reshaping America's military for a new era. The Clinton administration's 
"Bottom Up Review" outlined the kind of new military that it sought-a military 
that was smaller, more mobile, and more capable of new missions for the chang-
ing threat environment. This new military, too, would produce savings on de-
fense expenditures. The result of this effort-and of a follow-up study in 1997, 
the Quadrennial Defense Review-was to produce a smaller, more technologi-
cally sophisticated military with the ability to fight two major regional conflicts 
(MRCs) simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously) and to undertake several new 
tasks, such as international peacekeeping. 
The third initial principle, promoting democracy worldwide, was an effort to 
move away from the status quo approach that the administration claimed the 
Bush administration followed and to embrace global democratic reform. "My 
' ,, 
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administration,'~ Bill Clinton declared, "will stand up for democracy.'' 11 The 
emphasis on democracy was embraced not only to espouse American values but 
also as· a· mechanism to achieve a more peaceful world. As noted above, the 
more democracies in the world; the ro'ore likely peace would be maintained.P 
· A s'ynergistic relationship existed among these principles for American for-
. eign ·policy. ·As . America's economy· rebounded, a strong and flexible defense 
posture would be possible, albeit one that would not burden the American econ-
omy. A' sound American economy, bolstered by a solid defense, would allow 
. the United States to promote democracy across the world. In all, the creation of 
more democracies' across the world would produce a safer international envi-
ronment. '" . · :.· · " · ' · · · · · · -- · 
" 
: "; '/,'., -
,_,, - , , - I , ~ ,. , . 
THE STRATEGY OF ENLARGEMENT, · 
'· 
,_ ' ' •·''· -7_ ' , ) , ••••• ". - -
By Septemb~r 1993; these initial· principles were expanded and incorporated 
into a broader' statement labeled the "sti-ategy of enlargement."15 This strate~ 
was designed to replace the containment strategy and to give a more dynarruc 
vision to the Clinton administration's overall approach. In the words of Anthony 
Lake the strategy of enlargement meant the "enlargement of the world's free 
community of market democracies,"16 The strategy had four major components: 
"[l] strengthen the community of major 'market democracies ... [2] foster and 
consolidate new democracies arid market economies where possible · · · [3] 
counter the aggression-and support the liberalization of states hostile to de-
mocracy and markets ... [and] [4] p~rsue our humanitarian agenda not only by 
providing aid but also by working to help· democracy and market economies 
[develop)."17 · · · · · · . ' " ··· 
_As this strategy was outlined; Lake ·and. other key foreign policy offici_als 
reiterated several other foreign policy principles that would shape administratwn 
policy: IS the United States was committed to a global role; it would act unilat· 
erally or multilaterally, depending on the· ci~cunisiances to achieve its goals; 
and it would use American fo'rce when n'ecessary: Res;onding to critics who 
argued that Clinton's policy was driven too much by global considerations and 
not enough by U.S. interests, Lake maintained that American national interests 
would always be the guide to policy actions.· ' : ;· · · 
' , "·' ;,-
SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE INl~IA~, APPROACH 
Despite the effort to refocus and reshape ~erican foreign policy in a rnore 
coherent way with this strategy, it' soon became a sou-ice of weakness when the 
strategy of enlargement did not gain rrn.ich support at. home The overall ap· 
proach was criticized outside the administration ·as be,ing le~s a strategy and 
more ,,a st~te?1ent of principles, as overly 'ambitious . and lacking "operational 
terms (K1ssmger 1994 7 4) d ··· · · · re 
' • • an as approaching "foreign policy as 1f it we 
on a supermarket shopping spree, grabbing whatever it takes a fancy to."19 
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Senator John McCain characterized the approach as lacking "a conception of 
what they want the world to look like in ten or 20 years."20 It was even viewed 
skeptically inside the administration. Secretary of State Warren Christopher saw 
the strategy of enlargement simply as "a trade policy masquerading as foreign 
policy" and not as a way to address significant international problems that re-
quired attention on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, as one official said, "Chris-
topher just refused to use the 'E' word."21 
Furthermore, the strategy did not provide a clear enough guide to American 
policy in several key arenas that the Clinton administration faced. For instance, 
how did the strategy suggest specific policy direction for American actions in 
Bosnia or Somalia? How did it help specify the actions that the United States 
ought to pursue toward the changes in Russia and China? How did it guide 
policy for the new kinds of strategic and transnational threats, whether from the 
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center or from the perfidy posed by Saddam 
Hussein? 
SOME REVISIONS IN APPROACH 
By early 1995, Secretary of State Christopher sought to give more concrete 
definition to the administration's foreign policy.22 He did so by outlining several 
specific policy principles and linking them to American actions in key areas of 
the world. While Christopher once again committed the United States to global 
engagement and leadership, he also indicated that America would pursue co-
operative ties with other powerful nations, seek to adapt and build sound eco-
nomic and security institutions in the international community, and support 
democracy and human rights. In turn, these principles would lead to a focus on 
opening up the global trading order, building a new security system in Europe, 
seeking a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, halting the spread of weap-
ons of mass destruction, and combating international crime. These principles 
and proposed actions would also do something else: they would increasingly 
emphasize the political/security arena, even as the economic policy focus re-
mained, and would increasingly involve the president directly in policy direc-
tion. 
Two years later, near the beginning of the second term in March 1997, the 
new national security adviser-Samuel (Sandy) Berger-gave an even more 
pronounced security focus to the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Berger 
now identified "six key strategic objectives" that the Clinton administration 
would seek to address in the new term: "working for an undivided, democratic 
peaceful Europe ... forging a strong, stable Asia Pacific community ... em-
bracing our role ... as a decisive force for peace in the world ... building the 
bulwarks through a more open and competitive trading system ... and main-
taining a strong military and fully funded diplomacy."23 These kinds of objec-
tives appeared to be much more concrete than those in the original strategy of 
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enlargement and were also more typical of American objectives in earlier dec-
ades:. . · .,, 
.· · Two months later, the Clinton· administration also reported to Congress on its 
'.'National Security Strategy for a New Century" and, significantly, inverted two 
of. the three policy principles originally identified in I 993. It now identified 
Acieiica'score objectives as seeking "to enhance our security with effective 
diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win, to bolster 
· ··. Ameri~a' s' economic prosperity [and] to promote democracy abroad."2~ In es· 
· .. · sence, ·the tr~ditional · political/military emphasis gained increased primacy 
· among the key objectives or. policy principles, even as the economic security 
goal and the democracy goal remained important objectives. By this time, too 
(and most likely dating b'ack to I 994, over Haiti and Bosnia), President Clinton 
had becom~ fully engaged in the foreign affairs arena and the direction of policy. 
Finally, in February .1999, President Clinton again outlined a new foreign 
policy direction by identifying five major challenges that the United States faced 
at the dawn of the new iillllennium.25 Significantly, the first two challenges 
revealed the continued emphasis. on political/military concerns by calling for 
building "a more peaceful 21st century" by renewing alliances, whether through 
NATO expansion or renewing alliances with Japan and Korea, and by bringing 
"our former adversaries, Russia and China," into international policy "as open, 
prosperous, stable nations." The thifd challenge, too, had a security ring to it, 
although it was directed more toward the new threats and dangers in the inter· 
national arena than the past ones. The United States must seek "to build a future 
in which our people are safe from dangers that arise ... from proliferation, fro~ 
terrorism, from drugs, from the. multiple catastrophes that could arise from c~­
mate change." Only the fourth and fifth challenges reflected the kind of emphasis 
that the administration originally_ brought to foreign policy in 1993. They fo-
cused _on creating "a world trading 'and financial system that will lift the lives 
of ordmary people on every continent around the world" and keeping "freedom 
as a top goal for the world of the 21st century." In short, security relations and 
stat~-to-state relations were now receiving a ireater emphasis by the adminis-
tratton than the restructuring of the global society through democratic enlarge· 
ment that marked the beginning of the administration. 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES: 
SOURCES OF POLICY REVISIONS .· . 
_Th~se revisions in foreign polidy· pd~rities::_moving from the original three 
pnncip_les and the strategy of enlargem~~t, and then to Christopher's, Berger's 
and Clmton's reformulaf b. . · · d' c-
. . tons-may e perceived as refinement of policy ire 
tlon or may be viewed as a · · 1· to 
I. more s1gmficant transformation from idea ism rea ism. Whatever one's ulf t · 
. . ima e assessment, these changes do reveal two un-portant modifications· (1) th "d · 1 
· e pres1 ent now saw foreign policy as a cruc1a area 
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of policy interest, and (2) the emphasis in foreign policy had shifted from the 
earliest days of the administration. 
These changes, of course, did not occur in a vacuum; instead, they were the 
result of policy successes and failures in both the international and domestic 
arenas for the Clinton administration. By examining key foreign policy actions 
in these two arenas, we can gain a better sense of how these changes in policy 
priorities came about and can begin to judge the likely stability of these changes 
for American foreign policy at the start of a new millennium. 
International Challenges 
Early on in the Clinton administration, several international challenges re-
quired the administration (and the president) to focus more fully on foreign 
policy and to rethink its initial approach. As noted, the three key principles and 
the strategy of enlargement proved less than adequate foreign policy guides for 
addressing specific problems in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Russia, and Central 
Europe. As a result, policy became somewhat ad hoc and often driven by do-
mestic political considerations. In fact, one critic characterized the early Clinton 
approach as foreign policy by "social work" and not as an approach protecting 
American interests.26 Such criticism only added to the budding controversy over 
foreign policy and accelerated the call for policy reformulation. 
The cases of Somalia and Bosnia in particular serve to illustrate the uncer-
tainty in policymaking during the early years of the Clinton administration. 
Although the Bush administration had intervened in Somalia in December 1992 
to provide humanitarian assistance to those suffering from the warring tribal 
clans, the Clinton administration sought to expand the mission there. The new 
administration enlarged the mission to include a nation-building goal in which 
the United States would help to restore both order and a functioning government 
in Somalia. By the fall of 1993, the new mission had failed, owing to the 
sustained resistance of some clans and the ambivalence of the Clinton admin-
istration over how much force it wanted to use. In October 1993, the killing of 
eighteen Army rangers, the dragging of a dead American through the streets of 
Mogadishu, and the public display and ridicule of a captured American produced 
a sharp response from both the U.S. Congress and the American public. The 
Clinton administration and Congress moved quickly to end American involve-
ment there. The direction of American foreign policy was very much in doubt. 
The effectiveness of the administration's initial policy toward Bosnia proved 
equally troubling. Bosnia, a former republic of Yugoslavia, had declared its 
independence in 1992, an action that precipitated a civil war among ethnic Serbs, 
ethnic Croats, and Muslims living there. While the Bush administration had 
largely adopted a hands-off stance regarding that conflict, Bill Clinton asserted 
that his administration would take decisive action by adopting a "lift and strike" 
policy-lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims to allow them to 
defend themselves, and striking the Serbs with American air power. Once in 
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office, Clinton did neither.· Instead, the administration's initial inaction was car-
icatured as one of "rift and drift"-a rift with its European allies over appro-
priate policy·,· and drift due to its indecisiveness over what to do next.27 Clinton 
administration policy eventually changed toward Bosnia by mid-1995, due to 
the increased atrocities that occurred in Bosnia and to Congress's prodding to 
lift the Ai'.nerican arms embargo. President Clinton became more fully engaged, 
and· the situatiOn on the ground changed due in part to NATO bombing. The 
Dayton ':Accords were eventually negotiated and signed in Paris among the con-
fticting'parties. In. essence, a rather 'detached policy from early on in the admin-
.istration had' evolved into a policy of substantial American engagement by late 
1995. .. . .·.. -. ' . . 
Several other international crises in the administration's early years also il-
lustrate the difficulty that it faced in p~oviding a clear and firm direction in 
foreign policy. On the one h~nd, the Clinton administration did very little when 
Rwanda eruptec( in genocide in April 1994, even though the administration's 
human rights concerns ,would seemingly have driven it toward substantial in-
volvement. The reason was that the Somalia experience paralyzed the admin-
., istration, producing a re'assessment of how and when American military power 
; should be used. On the other hand, the Clinton administration acted more ro-
): ... · bustly when Saddam Hussein sought to challenge the no-fly zones imposed on 
· ' Iraq by the international community. In October 1994, the administration or-
·-···· dered 36,000 American forces into Kuwait to serve as a deterrent to any con-
:·:, .. ,· templated Iraqi action. Similarly in September 199~, the administration adopt~d 
, '.( an interventionist policy toward Haiti, wh~n its earlier diplomatic and econorruc 
1 ' measures failed to budge the military leaders from power. . 
:' . Several other international issues pulled the administration toward greater m-
:-;; volvement in foreign policy. In post-Communist Russia, for example, the situ-.i~.' ation was quite unsettled, and the stability of the new government under Boris 
Yeltsin was in doubt. The Clinton administration thus moved to provide a sub-
stanti~l a~o~nt of economic assistance to Russia and diplomatic support to 
Y eltsm. Sirrularly, while the negotiations in the Middle East peace process bad 
produced agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and 
Jordan by 1993 and 1994, respectively, the administration quickly saw that fur-
ther progress ~ould require sustained attention· by· the president. 
~wo other important policy issues-most favored nation (MFN) status for ~hma and the question of NATO expansion-prompted the Clinton administra· 
ho~ to addre~s foreign policy but also revealed the difficulty that the adrninis-
trat10n faced lll reconci·1· f - ,. · ·· · · · · · · · · t' ns 
. . mg some o Its 1oreign policy pnnciples with its ac JO · 
The issue of grantmg MFN status for China, of course·· WaS not a new one. It h~d v~xed past administrations, especially iri light of d~cuil1e.nted human rights 
vmlatwns by ~hina (e.g., the Tiananmen Square m·assacre of June 1989). Indeed, ~~emocratic Congress challenged the Bush adrrunist~ation on its granting of 
1 status an? nearly passed a resolution overriding a presidential veto on at 
east one occasion. What was new was that candidate Bill Clinton asserted that 
-. -,_ ··, 
·.: .::< ,\ f_ ~;' -~ 
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he would stand up to the tyrants in Beijing and promote democracy. However, 
in a quick policy reversal, shortly after his election in November 1992, Clinton 
announced that he would continue the past Bush policy. Indeed, in May 1993, 
Clinton granted China provisional renewal of MFN status, but he required that 
China make real progress in the human rights area for subsequent renewals. In 
May 1994, however, the Clinton administration not only decided to renew MFN 
status, but also delinked future renewals from human rights considerations. Since 
then, the Clinton administration routinely renewed MFN status, arguing that a 
free trading relationship is the most practical way to promote political (demo-
cratic) change in the long term. At least in the short term, the administration's 
economic principle trumped its democratic reform principle. 
The issue of NATO's future was hardly new either. The Bush administration 
had already sought to enhance consultation and cooperation with the countries 
of central Europe after the end of the Cold War. The Clinton administration, 
however, needed to decide how far NATO change would go, especially in light 
of its effort to nurture better ties with Russia. Its initial NATO proposal called 
for creating "Partnership for Peace," a kind of "junior membership" for states 
of central Europe, including Russia, in which individual states would complete 
an agreement with NATO on cooperative and "confidence-building" measures 
between them. Some countries of central Europe were not satisfied with the 
partnership idea and desired full membership instead. As a way to put a firmer 
stamp on Clinton administration foreign policy (and perhaps to appeal to central 
European ethnics at home), several advisers within the administration urged the 
president to offer full membership to some states.28 The proposed new NATO 
states-Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic-wanted full membership to 
ensure their own security, while the United States saw it as a way to facilitate 
democracy in the region.29 Russia objected strongly to this initiative because 
NATO expansion represented yet another kind of encirclement and another way 
to divide up Europe. After several maneuvers, the United States and its NATO 
alliance announced at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 that it would go ahead 
with the expansion plan in April 1999-the fiftieth anniversary of the alliance. 
Thus, the Clinton administration ultimately opted for promoting democracy (and 
security) in Europe rather than focusing so singularly on solidifying American-
Russian relations. 
Domestic Challenges 
A number of domestic challenges over foreign policy also encouraged grcat~r 
presidential attention to international issues and, ultimately, some change m 
policy direction. The first and most difficult domestic challenge on a foreign 
policy issue was the administration's effort to gain approval from Congres~ for 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although the_Amenc_an 
public had consistently supported efforts to provide great~r econom~c secunty 
through international actions,30 domestic critics raised senous questions about 
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NAFTA. S~bstantial opposition to NAFfA came from members of the presi· 
dent's own party, especially from labor unions, who were anxious about the 
loss of jobs to cheaper labor in Mexico; producer groups (e.g., citrus and fruit 
growers), who would suffer from the trade pacts; and environmentalists, who 
were conce~ed about the enforcement of pollution and water standards along 
the Mexican border. As a result, the administration spent a considerable amount 
of time bargaining to gain congressional approval. In the end, the Clinton ad-
ministration was forced to rely more on Republicans than Democrats to ensure 
• 31 the passage of the NAFT A agreement in the House of Representatives. 
A second area of domestic foreign policy challenge emerged over American 
military involvement abroad. The public's view of such actions had been quite 
stable-and quite negative-· for some time. That is, the public was generally 
opposed to interventions by the Clinton administration that sought to change 
domestic regimes or interventions that might entangle the United States in on· 
going civil wars.32 Further, the public was not very supportive of foreign policy 
efforts that emphasized the promotion of democracy and human rights, albeit 
generally sympathetic to the suffering of the peoples in these countries.33 Hence, 
the Clinton administration faced an uphill battle in gaining public support for 
undertaking military measures, be they in Somalia, Bosnia, or Haiti. Moreover, 
the level of public support for President Clinton's foreign policy leadership 
during the first two years of his administration suffered as a result. 34 Indeed, 
public caution over the use of American troops continued to influence the ad-
ministration's actions, as evidenced by its reluctance to discuss this option dur· 
ing the war in Kosovo. 
Domestic political opposition on foreign policy crystallized when Republicans 
won control of both houses of Congress in the 1994 congressional elections. 
Not surprisingly, Republicans were skeptical of the Clinton administration's do-
mestic policy priorities, .but they were also at odds with much of the adminis-
tration's foreign policy goals and actions. To be sure, most Republican members 
of Congress supported the Clinton administration's efforts at liberalizing trade 
arou~d the world, but they generally opposed undertaking humanitarian inter· 
v~nhons, participating in United Nations peacekeeping efforts, promoting sus-
tamab.le dev~~opment, and cutting the defense budget and the size of the 
Amencan ~htary. Hence, the new congressional majority rather quickly un-
dertook actions seekin t t · A · • · · . · u· nal 
. g o nm menca s foreign assistance and mterna 0 ~ffairs budget, stop the sending of American forces abroad and reverse the cuts 
m defense spending that the administration had initiated. Congress's overall 
record on these efforts was mixed, but they did take some actions that stopped, 
slowed down or quest'o d ci· · , ·. . . · · ·u·a-
. . ' 
1 ne some mton admmistration foreign policy mi tlves In this se c · · li 
d . · . nse, ongress had an effect on the direction of foreign po cy unng the Clmton years. 
In the economic area £ · · h f 
r f ' or mstance, three significant actions illustrate t e e · iorts o Congress to alt th C . 
A . . er e hnton agenda. First Congress objected to an mencan bailout of th M · ' d 
e exican government after the Mexican peso plunge 
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t ,' ... ) , • 
> ,:' ';1, "' i.'' ' ;. 
in late 1994 and early 1995. The Clinton administration saw, the bailout as vital 
to the success of NAFfA and to the econ'omic health of the United States, but 
Congress saw it as leading to rescuing other insolvent countries around the world 
at America's expense. The Clinton administration eventually used its own ex-. 
ecutive authority to fashion a. $50 billion assistance package. Second, Congres~ · 
was most reluctant to 'refinance the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis had· engulfed several nations. there-. Thailand, In- . 
donesia, and South Korea, among others. Congressi~nal debate and discussions 
in various forums surrounded this 'executi~e bran~h req~estfor $17.9 billion.''' 
Finally, after extensive White House,' business, and farm group lobbying, Con-: 
gress did approve a $17.9 billion appropriation to replenlsh the IMF, albeit mo~e 
than twelve months later, in October 1998. Congress did; so o~ly. after adding . 
, ,, - • , , , '·'· ", ' I 
several conditions on IMF actions.35 Third, and perhaps most significantly, Con-.. 
gress failed to renew "fast-track" negotiating authority for the e~ecui.ive branch 
in November 1997. Under fast-track authority, Congress empowered th'e presi-
dent to negotiate trade agreements with other countries, leaving· Congress only 
the right to vote the pacts up or down, without benefit of any amendments. The 
authority offered the executive (and other nations) a considerable advantage, 
since once a pact is completed, it could not be changed. Ironically, Democratic 
opposition in the House to fast-track authority ultimately doomed congressional 
action on this measure. 
In the security area, Congress also took actions that challenged the Clinton 
approach. Perhaps the most dramatic measures occurred over Somalia, Bosnia, 
and, more recently, Kosovo. After the October 3, 1993, incident in which eigh-
teen Americans were killed in Somalia, Congress quickly voted to require Amer-
ican troops to be withdrawn from that country by March 31, 1994. As the 
Dayton Accords were being completed in November 1995, and the president 
announced that American forces would be sent to that troubled country, both 
chambers of Congress passed resolutions supporting American forces in Bosnia 
but opposing the Clinton policy toward that country. In March 1999, just as the 
NATO operation was· about to begin over Kosovo, the U.S. Senate passed a 
resolution of support, but it did so only by a very tepid margin (58-41), with 
most senators voting along party lines. At the same time, the House backed the 
American military personnel involved in the air attacks virtually unanimously 
(424-1), but it did not debate the merits of the air attack as such.36 However, 
on a tie vote (213-213) 'in April 1999, the House rejected a resolution author-
izing American participation in the air war.37 
More generally, Congress sought to reshape defense spending away from the 
priorities of the Clinton administration. Under the Clinton defense plans, for 
instance,: the A~ericanffiilitary was trimmed back significantly, with each ser-
vice undergoing personnel reductions. The army and air force had the big~est 
cuts, each with a 45 percent reduction since 1989, and the navy and mannes 
had reductions of 36 percent and 12 percent, respectively.38 Similarly, o~erall 
spending on defense was cut during the Clinton years, although the Clmton 
,_ •I 
" ' ) ' ' '(· -' :· ,:~.. -~ ' 
·l, 
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administration' began to. recommend some increases near the end of its term. 
When the Republicans gained majority control of the Congress, they called for 
iricie~ses in spending on defense preparedness-additional training for personnel 
an;i"modern ,we~ponry-·  and questioned whether the United States military was 
c~~ently equipped to fight two MRCs simultaneously. In addition, the Repub-
lican Congress and the White House continually clashed over a variety of other 
issu~s-an anti~defense missile system for the United States, the extension of 
·the Nuclear Non-Proliferation· Treaty, the passage of the Chemical Weapons 
. '·Convention, and the ratification for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Al-
.. .' though Congress only enjoyed limited success with several of these measures, 
· ·' it still succeeded in making it more difficult for the administration to continue 
its foreign policy direction. . 
Perhaps the major impact of Congress on the Clinton administration's foreign 
policy occurred on two recent security questions related to nuclear weaponry. 
On one issue, the Republican Congress prodded the administration toward its 
favored position on a national missile defense system, and on the other, it sty-
mied the administration's effort in gaining approval for a ban on nuclear testing. 
On the former, Congress succeeded in keeping a theater missile defense program 
alive in the mid- l 990s despite opposition from the Clinton administration, and 
ultimately enacted the National Missile Defense Act in 1999, with President 
Clinton's signature. Under this legislation, the United States must deploy a lim· 
ited system "as soon as technologically feasible," and the Clinton administration 
had promised a decision by June 2000. 39 That decision was later postponed and 
left to the new administration, assuming office in January 2001. On the latter, 
the Senate rendered a stinging foreign policy defeat by recommending against 
the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because it viewed the 
treaty as ftawed.40 While the treaty passed the Senate by a narrow margin (51-
48), largely along party lines, that margin was still sixteen votes short of the 
necessary two-thirds support required. The defeat was characterized as a "hu-
miliating ~etback" for a treaty that "was supposed to be the crowning achiev~­
me~t o~ his foreign policy."41 In this sense; Congress sought and succeeded JO 
redi~ectmg American foreign policy toward its own priorities in these areas. 
. Fmally: a domestic issue also contributed to greater attention to foreign pol-
icy-~he ~mpeachment of President Clinton by the House of Representatives and 
the tnal m the S~nate in late 1998 and early 1999. Although these actions 
~esulted_from President Clinton's involvement with a White House intern, Mon-
ica Le~.msky, and his lying about this affair to the American public and federal 
authont1es they also had · d' f" ·" · I thy 
. . . ' an m Irect e ~ect on foreign 'policy. During the eng 
mvestigat1ons and hearin h. · ·· · · · ak n 
. gs over t is matter, the president seemed to t e 0 
more foreign policy duf · I d. . · th h 
. . ies-mc u mg travelmg overseas-to illustrate at e 
was contmmng to conduct the matters of state, to present a sense of normalcy, 
and to downplay this · I h . . . 
. issue. n s ort, foreign policy received more and more 
attention by th d · · · 
e a mmistratwn and the president by 1998 and 1999. 
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While it is difficult to assess fully the foreign policy impact of the Clinton 
administration at close range, let me suggest some possible short- and long-term 
legacies left by the administration.42 For analytic purposes, these legacies will 
be divided between the administration's likely impact on policy priorities toward 
other nations and its likely impact on the policymaking process within the 
United States, but in essence they are intertwined, because domestic politics 
continue to play a prominent role in the shaping of American foreign policy. 
Policy Priorities 
On the policy side, the first and perhaps most important legacy of the Clinton 
administration is the commitment to continued American involvement in global 
affairs after the end of the Cold War. Voices from several different political 
quarters-and ranging all along the political spectrum-called for various forms 
of isolationism or unilateralism with the end of the Cold War,43 but the Clinton 
administration never wavered in its commitment to maintaining a global role 
for the United States. Presidential and executive branch statements throughout 
the administration's two terms, virtually without exception, confirmed (and re-
inforced) this commitment to global involvement.44 
The commitment to sustained international engagement was manifested more 
fully through the several significant economic and military actions that the ad-
ministration undertook. The passage of NAFI'A and GAIT are important in-
dicators of this engagement, as are the continued presence of American military 
personnel in Europe (roughly at 100,000) and in Asia (also at roughly 100,000 
in Japan and Korea). Specific American military actions, however, provide an 
even greater sense of the commitment to a sustained global role. Whether it was 
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq, sending a significant military component 
for the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, conducting the war with Serbia 
against Kosovo (and subsequently sending in peacekeeping forces), or proposing 
(and achieving) NATO expansion, the Clinton administration consistently sought 
engagement over nonengagement after the Cold War. In this sense, the com-
mitments and engagements initiated by the Clinton administration seem to en-
sure a global role for the United States, in both the short and the long term. 
A second policy legacy-and the one that will likely represent the adminis-
tration's greatest long-term, specific policy bequeath-is the placement of for-
eign economic policy at the center of America's international policy agenda. 
While global economic security issues have always been an important concern 
for post-World War II administrations, the Clinton administration placed an 
even higher policy priority on those issues with the end of the Cold War. In 
this sense, the bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements negotiated by the 
administration are, and will remain, a significant policy legacy. The maintenance 
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and expansion of these agreements will necessarily continue as a high priority 
for future administrations a~. global economic interdependence accelerates and 
America's economic hegemony continues to be challenged. If an enduring leg-
acy of the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was for American pres-
idents, to assume more responsibility for assisting in managing the American 
domestic economy, a likely legacy of the Clinton administration will be for 
future American presidents to assume more responsibility in managing the global 
economy. .. .; , , . . 
·.There is also an important global corollary to this economic legacy: through 
its bilateral and multilateral economic actions, the Clinton administration be-
queathed a more liberal global trading order to the international community than 
·when it took. office. The ratification of the GA IT accords was particularly sig-
. nificant, since it created a new successor global economic organization-the 
···. WTO, or.World.Trad~ Organiza'tion. This organization is more fully committed 
· .;.," to enforcing the principle of fre'e trade than ever before. Other multilateral ac-
tions-whether thr'ough p~ssing NAFr A, prodding APEC to create a free-trade 
·· ;'. area, or initia~ing' Western Hemisphere discussions on free trade-contributed 
' ' , to this more 'open trade environment, too. Further, the Clinton administration 
, i',. .•. signed over 270 trade liberalization pacts with other countries during its tenure.45 
'. ·.· > These pacts iridude an extraordinarily important one with China from November 
1.·· · ! 1999 in which the Clinton administration pledged its support to obtain perrna-
< nent normal tJ:ade r~lations (PNTR) for China from the U.S. Congress and to 
. , support China's .,memhership in the WTO. In late 2000, Congress approved 
PNTR for China~ ' · · · .. ·. 
' ·> ·· . This free-tr~de legacy, ho~ever, continues to be controversial. The massive 
' deDJ.onstrations, at .the WT_O' s meeting in Seattle in December 1999 illustrate the 
i . · concerns and an~uish of riiany groups across many nations over the expansion 
'< .·• .. of free trade. While some nations benefit from these efforts at opening the global 
.. ' mar~et, both in~tlie._long and short ruri, other nations fear that they may be left 
. . · 
1 b~hmd. In ~dditioi;i, many environmental and labor groups fear that their interests 
will be senouslyC damaged if some liniits are not placed on these free-trade 
agreements. Nonetheless, President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to the 
free trad · · l · f 
_ -. e pnncip e and to the WTO in Seattle, even as he called for some re orm 
withm that organization.46 ·. · 
A third long-term policy le~acy is in the redefinition of the threat environment 
faced by th U · · · Id ~ . mted States after the Cold War. Unlike the previous post-Wor 
War II admm tr · · · · .·· . b 1 
. '· · threat e v· is .. atio~s, the Cl1.nton admi.n.istration had to contend with a glo a 
< War lar n Iron~en~ tli~t ~~s.1:'c;i,w .more div~rse and more diffuse. While the Cold 
of nucl:~1::::r~sented · .. ~ .. sm?ul~ threat from ~e Soviet Union with it.s arsenal 
( P _ ns, the new environment presented new threats rangmg from new or old) reg10nal d · · · · · er 
r . 1 · 47 • an co.mmunal conflicts· to· any old (or new) great pow rva nes. As regIOnal · : . · ty f powers seek regional dominance and acquire a vane 0 weapons of mass destru f ( h · · · · h m ical) th . c 10n w ether they be nuclear biological, or c e · 
' ey potentially pose dangers for the national interest~ of the United States. 
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As communal conflicts within and between states over religious, cultural, and 
ethnic identities increase, they, too, present the prospect that the United States 
might be drawn into them. The fighting over Kashmir between the newest nu-
clear power states, India and Pakistan, in the summer of 1999 illustrates the 
former, while the seventy-eight-day war over Kosovo, also in 1999, illustrates 
the latter. American quarrels with Russia over Kosovo or Bosnia, or American 
disputes with China over Taiwan, or spying within the United States illustrates 
the continuity of great power conflicts, too. 
A fourth, and more troublesome, policy legacy flows from the third: While 
the Clinton administration recognized these new threats, it was less successful 
in developing a "strategic consensus" around them and in restructuring the mil-
itary in a way to deal with them.48 That is, the administration failed to define 
and rank-order these threats and failed to outline a strategy (or set of strategies) 
to deal with them. Leading analysts, both implicitly and explicitly, touch on this 
policy shortcoming. Joseph Nye recently outlined the need to redefine the "new 
national interest" in the information age, and specified alternate responses to 
differing American interests (and threats).49 Earlier, Samuel Huntington worried 
about "the erosion of the American national interests" and was pessimistic that 
the United States could move beyond the current "foreign policy of particular-
ism," a policy largely driven by ethnic and commercial interests.so As such, 
future administrations face at least a short-term Clinton legacy in seeking to put 
together a coherent policy consensus to deal with these differing threats. 
To be sure, the Clinton administration sought to do so but for the most part 
did not succeed, as evidenced by the great gulf between opinion leaders and the 
public across a wide array of foreign policy issues.s1 While creating a policy 
consensus has many dimensions and represents a formidable task for any ad-
ministration, two components in the short term will remain particularly vexing 
for future administrations. The first focuses on the appropriate American re-
sponse to regional and communal conflicts, and the second deals with devising 
the appropriate strategy for managing great power conflicts in the new millen-
nium, especially with an emerging great power such as China. 
The first component encompasses both reshaping the American military in a 
way to enable the United States to respond to regional and communal threats, 
and developing a clearer decision calculus of when and what kind of force 
should be used in these conflicts. For the former, the Clinton administration 
initially moved toward a considerable downsizing of the military and a substan-
tial reliance on the "revolution in military affairs" to address emerging threats. 
While the administration has recently proposed greater funding for military pre-
paredness, including some weapons modernization, resolving the debate over 
the size and shape of the military for the new century is an immediate short-
term legacy for any new administration. For the latter, the administration issued 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (or PDD 25) after the Somalia debacle. This 
directive identified specific conditions that needed to be met for America~ ~ar­
ticipation in multilateral peacekeeping operations. Although these cond1t10ns 
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represent an attempt to establish a closer linkage between domestic politics and 
foreign policy; they. are hardly ironclad guides to policy, since they allow con-
siderable judgment on the part of decision makers. 
·. ·The second. component of any effort to build a policy consensus requires a 
fuller ·strategy for dealing with great power conflicts. \Vhile Russia will continue 
to pose some uncertainty for the United States, China, as an emerging great 
power,' poses a greater. policy challenge for American administrations in the new 
· ffiillennitini. The Clinton administration embraced a policy of "constructive en-
. gagement," manifesting itself in a variety of continuing contacts and interactions 
. -- between the two countries. The rationale for this policy was that these contacts 
would stimulate Chinese economic and political reforms in ways compatible 
with American interests. (A similar rationale was used to support PNTR for 
China ~nd for. its membership in WTO.) This approach, however, created sub-
stantial domestic controversy. The Chinese have been accused of engaging in a 
litany of activities. that jeopardize this relationship-whether it be spying within 
the United States, contributing illegal campaign funds in the 1996 elections, 
engaging in unfair trade practices, committing continuous human rights viola-
tions, promoting abortions, or threatening Taiwan. Thus, in the short tenn, future 
administrations will be faced with how to manage this relationship effectively 
as part of a more general effort to develop a new foreign policy consensus. 
Policymaking Process 
Many of the Clinton administration's policymaking legacies flow from these 
foreign policy priorities and reveal more fully how domestic politics and foreign 
policy are closely linked today. While these legacies generally broaden domestic 
~articipation in foreign policy decision making, they also represent a continua-
tion. (~nd s_ometimes an acceleration) of trends already begun under previous 
admm1strat10ns. In this sense, these legacies generally connote incremental long-
t~rm changes _in the policymaking process rather than abrupt short-tenn tren~s 
tied to a particular administration. For convenience of discussion, these poli-
cymaking legacies may be divided between those that have developed within 
the executive b~anch and those that have developed beyond it. . 
In the executive branch, the Clinton administration left at least four policy-
?1-aking legacies. First and foremost, the Clinton administration's experience 
Illustrates ~e crucial role of the president's involvement in the foreign policy 
~rocess. With the increasing domestification of A~erican foreign policy, a pres-
ident needs to be personally involved in the foreign policy process and must 
usually work to fram · · u·c 
. e Issues m a way consonant with the current domes 
environment. At other times, the president must take clear-and sometimes dif-hfi~ult-stances, even in the face of public opposition and work hard to achieve IS preferred J" ' 
,. po icy outcome. In short, and as the Clinton administration often 
1ound out whether fr · 1· . · t 
' ammg po icy compatible with the domestic environmen 
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or framing policy at odds with popular views, direct-and continuous-presi-
dential involvement in the foreign policy arena is crucial today.52 
The next two policymaking legacies-the number of issues constituting the 
foreign policy agenda and the number of participants addressing them in Wash-
ington-emanate from the changing global threat environment in international 
politics today. While security issues remained an important component of the 
foreign policy agenda, especially as the Clinton administration's policy approach 
evolved, the breadth of the issues that fall under the foreign policy rubric has 
broadened to include global environmental, economic, and social issues. As 
these kinds of issues expanded, the number of foreign policy participants within 
the executive branch (and beyond) necessarily grew as well. Now, virtually all 
cabinet departments and offices within the executive branch can place some 
claim on a foreign policy issue. 
Consider, for example, the relatively new foreign policy issue of international 
drug trafficking from a South American country, and the array of agencies in-
volved in addressing various aspects of that issue. The Department of State, the 
Department of Commerce, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
would likely be involved in addressing the political and economic aspects of 
the relationship with the country where the drugs originate. The U.S. Customs 
Bureau, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the Department of Defense would likely be involved in efforts to control 
the transference of drugs into the United States. Finally, the Department of the 
Treasury, the FBI, and, more generally, the Department of Justice would likely 
be involved in tracking the attempts to launder the drug profits and bringing 
those responsible for these activities to justice. 
A fourth policymaking legacy flows from these last two and reflects the eco-
nomic policy priority underpinning the Clinton approach to foreign policy: the 
substantial increase in the number of individuals and institutions with economic 
expertise in the foreign policy making machinery of government at the start of 
the new millennium. At least four significant changes illustrate this enhanced 
economic role developed by the Clinton administration. First, the administration 
established a National Economic Council (NEC)-the equivalent, in theory, to 
the National Security Council-to provide economic advice on domestic and 
foreign policy concerns. Second, the administration formally included economic 
advisers as members of the committees forming the National Security Council 
decision-making system.53 Third, the administration restructured the Department 
of State to give a greater role to economic issues (e.g., the creation of the Office 
of the Coordinator for Business Affairs within the Undersecretariat for Eco-
nomic, Business and Agricultural Affairs). Fourth, and finally, the Clinton ad-
ministration has given increased prominence to the Department of the Treasury 
(and, particularly, the Secretary of the Treasury) in formulating economic policy 
and to the Department of Commerce in promoting trade policy around the 
world.54 While this legacy may be short term (since a new administration ~as 
substantial latitude to restructure the executive branch as it sees fit), the changmg 
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global economy and the sustained involvement of "domestic" bureaucracies in 
foreign policy issues in earlier administrations suggest that these structural and 
process changes are more likely to be long term. 
Outside the executive branch, several policymaking legacies remain from the 
Clinton administration, but they, too, largely reflect an acceleration of trends 
already under way. The first centers on the increasing role of Congress in dealing 
with foreign policy issues, and the second focuses on the increasing partisan 
divisions over the direction of American foreign policy. On balance, the inten· 
sities of these trends are probably short-term in that they may be ameliorated 
by a new administration or a new Congress; however, the general directions of 
these trends are unlikely to be reversed any time soon. 
While an increased congressional role in foreign policy is hardly a new phe· 
nomenon, it quickened during the Clinton years, especially as the foreign policy 
issue agenda widened, and political differences surfaced. These institutional di-
visions ranged across the entire foreign policy issue spectrum-from security to 
economic to environmental to social issues. Witness the extended debate be-
tween the branches on such issues as NAFf A, Bosnia, foreign assistance, global 
human rights, and global warming. Since many of these issues permeate the 
foreign policy/domestic policy divide, and affect constituencies in a differential 
way (i.e., the passage of NAFfA helps some members' districts but hurts oth-
ers), members of Congress are more likely to act more independently on these 
issues, regardless of party affiliation or presidential leadership. Hence, the "do-
mestification of foreign policy" has really come home to many lawmakers 
through these new international issues. 
Second, and following from the first, the partisan and ideological forei~n 
policy divisions intensified between the White House and Congress and within 
political parties during the Clinton years. Arms-control issues, such as the Chem-
ical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,55 and foreign 
aid issues have particularly sparked partisan (and ideological) debate between 
Democrats and Republicans. Some issues, too (e.g., the NAFTA vote in 1993 
or the fast-track vote in 1997) produced a sharp intra-party debate (among Dem-
ocrats) by exacerbating ideological divisions over the direction of American 
trad~ polic~. ~s one study demonstrates, partisan and ideological voting ~n 
foreign pohcy i~sues in both houses of Congress became more acrimonious ~ 
the Bush and Clmton years, with the level of executive/legislative bipartisanship 
lower than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War.56 
Two other policymaking legacies of the Clinton administration are likely to 
have ~ore long-term effects and involve the incorporation of more and more 
domestic. actors into the foreign policy process. One trend includes a greater r~~ .for l~t~rest groups in foreign policy making, the other a greater role for 
P he opmion. Over the past decade, for instance, the number of interest 
~roups-. and particularly those interests lobbying on behalf of foreign nations (~nc~udmg apparently illegal campaign contributions from abroad)-has grown 
sigmficantly. Virtually all the countries that used to be republics in the Soviet 
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Union have representatives in Washington, as well' as Russia, China, 'and a 
myriad list of smaller countries from around the world.· These foreign lobbies 
are 11ow standard fare in the nation's capital.57 In addition, lobbying by economic 
interest groups (e.g., over policy toward China) and new ethnic groups (e.g., the 
Central and East European Coalition over NATO expansion or aid to Central 
Europe) continue apace and have actually accelerated in recenLyears. 
Lastly, the role of public opinion in the foreign,policy process has been 
enhanced, especially since the Clinton administration relied so heavily on public 
opinion polling to shape or restrain its foreign policy actions: As foreign policy 
opinions remained remarkably stable after the end of the Cold,War, especially 
toward American military involvement abroad,58 the deg~ee ~f decision latitude 
f?r policymakers narrowed. The restraining effect of p{iblic, opinio,n ~ ?r the pub~ 
he mood) for the Clinton administration was especially evident in its' reluctance 
to send American ground forces abroad in civil conflicts 'a.lid it~ ccii:icem, about 
the possible loss of American lives in foreign lands. To be sure! the Clinio~ 
administration did on occasion act in opposition to the public mood (e.g'., ,·the 
intervention in Haiti), but it was still careful to assess the direction of the public'·. 
on key foreign policy questions, especially as evidenced over the war in Kosovo'\ 
Whether these public constraints will continue to be as confining for future·.,.,, 
leaders remains an open question,59 but the legacy of increased attention to the ~;P•, 
public's views remains. · 1" >·• , ·\j.;):'(c ,: ,, 
Finally, the greater involvement of interest groups and public opinion repre- .,"'\t~·v,::• 
' t~. ·-, 
sent opposite kinds of restraints on the foreign policy process as ,a legacy, of the ~,,;-;~"' 
Clinton years-one directing policy toward narrower individual interests; the ''fb'\1•• ' 
other directing it toward societal interests. Such conflicting policyjnaki~g lega- ·'i••i'ri: , , ' 
cies are a mixed blessing for any future administration, as it seeks to develop a,\« ':\•• 
coherent and consistent policy approach after the Clinton years'. ;,Yet, this,~· too, '" /~::!);·· ,: 
represents a lo~g~term legacy of the Clinton administration for the new millen- 1~;i'.1:!1" 
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CONCLUSIONS 
President Clinton came to office with limited interest in foreign policy but 
with a goal to change the direction of American foreign policy. Buffeted by 
both international 'and domestic challenges, the Clinton administration soon gave 
greater prominence to foreign affairs and adjusted its foreign policy approach 
as 'well. While its initial approach had a strong dose of idealism, the adminis-
tration moved toward a sense of realism by the end of its time in office. Security 
concerns incre~singly gained pride of place-whether dealing with changing 
relations with Russia or China, or the instability in the Balkans or the Middle 
East-over its ·commitment to economic and democratic concerns. To be sure, 
the administration's commitment to democratic enlargement and economic lib-
eralism remained important and prominent goals, but the political/military re-
'.·~·.;:·: .. 
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quirements of several pressing international issues often trumped these concerns 
by the end of its tenure. 
Still, the Clinton administration left several important policy legacies for fu. 
ture administrations. These included a commitment to a sustained global role 
for the United States in global affairs after the Cold War, an enhanced position 
for economic issues on the foreign policy agenda, and a redefinition of the global 
threat environment that the United States faces as it enters the new millennium. 
Another legacy, however, also remains. The administration did not succeed in 
developing and gaining widespread domestic support for a strategic consensus 
for when and how the United States should address regional and communal 
conflicts. Put more generally, the larger question on how values and interests 
should shape American foreign policy remains unresolved. 
On the domestic front, the Clinton administration left several important leg· 
acies for the foreign policymaking process. Importantly, the Clinton administra-
tion broadened the number of issues and actors involved in foreign policy within 
the executive branch and also incorporated more economic participants into the 
foreign policy decision-making apparatus of the government. More troublesome, 
perhaps, are other lingering legacies in the decision-making arena. Foreign 
policy became an increasingly contentious issue between Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch (as witnessed most dramatically with the vote on the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty) and more and more interest groups lobbied to influence 
the direction of American foreign policy, including an increasing number of 
foreign groups (as evidenced over trade policy with China). Finally, and in line 
with a more democratic emphasis in foreign affairs, public opinion and public 
polling also played a part in policymaking during the Clinton years. In short, 
then, domestic politics and foreign policy are increasingly linked in the new 
millennium. , . . .. · ·; 
As we gain some distance from the Clinton administration its foreign policy 
impact will come into sharper relief, and its short- and long~term legacies will 
become more recognizable. That is, future administrations will likely have to 
grapple with a mix of policy and policymaking concerns similar to the ones 
faced by the first post-Cold War administration and the answers to those con-
cerns by _succeeding administrations will go· a lo~g way in assessing more fully 
the ~egac1es of the Clinton years. Some of the key questions to use in evaluating 
the impact of the Clinton years on future administrations include tile following: 
How ?oes th~ administration mix political idealism' and political realism in an 
era wit~ multiple foreign policy threats? How does the administration define the 
approp_nate r?le for the United States in a world without a single opponent to 
shape its pohcy? How d th d . . · · . l" · to h . · oes e a mm1stration incoq)orate· domestic po 1t1cs 
s ~pe Amencan_ foreign policy? How effective is the administration in <level· 
opmg a domestic consens · · . • · · f!'ct d · us m an era when regional· and communal con 1 
ommate the global agenda? Wh"l · · · · Iy d"ft 0 I e each succeeding adffiinistration will supp 
L erent answers especiall h . · .· · . . . · ·- h 
' Y as t e mtemational context changes, tile approac 
' ' , • ~ , ' 1' ' • " 
,--.-
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of the Clinton administration offers a useful starting point in understanding the 
direction of American foreign policy after the Cold War. 
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